8. Should it be said that there is attainment of fruition (of pleasure and pain); we reply, not so, on account of difference.
But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies, like the individual soul, it follows that, like the latter, it is subject to the experience of pleasure and pain, such experience springing from connexion with bodies!--Of this objection the Sûtra disposes by remarking 'not so, on account of difference (of reason).' For what is the cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of good and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of the highest Self to which all evil is foreign. Compare the scriptural text 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on without eating'
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[paragraph continues] (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).--Here finishes the adhikarana of 'what is known everywhere.'
Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we must conclude that wherever fruition is referred to, the embodied soul only is meant!--Of this view the next adhikarana disposes.
